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Direct Voting by Property Owners 
Thomas W. Merrill^ 
Direct voting by property owners is a widespread but controversial tool for re- 
solving disputes over local collective goods. Direct voting has powerful advantages, in 
that it can harness the superior knowledge of many local minds, resolve controversies in 
a way that is perceived to be legitimate, and eliminate corrupt dealmaking. But it also 
has serious pitfalls, if local voters are poorly informed, or if they ignore external effects 
on other communities, or if the process is distorted by majoritarian or minoritarian bias. 
To capitalize on the advantages of local voting, and minimize the risks, this Article pro- 
poses that direct voting be limited to local property owners, in a one-owner, one-vote 
fashion. The issues chosen for resolution by direct voting should also be ones with uni- 
form high stakes for property owners, and minimal spillover effects outside the voting 
community. Applications to controversies over the creation of local historic districts and 
the use of eminent domain for economic development are discussed. 
Introduction 
Disputes about the provision of local collective goods have often 
been resolved by direct voting among local citizens. Special assess- 
ment districts, zoning referenda, and business improvement districts 
are familiar examples.1 In this Article, I consider the conditions that 
must be met to make direct democracy a potentially valuable tool for 
resolving local controversies. A variety of local policy disputes ex- 
amined in this Symposium are potential candidates for resolution 
through such a mechanism. A partial list includes consolidation of 
school districts,2 elimination of industrial zoning districts,3 the acquisi- 
tion of conservation areas,4 and the use of tax increment financing 
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1 See Robert C. Ellickson and Vicki L. Been, Land Use Controls: Cases and Materials 401-09, 
619-34 (Aspen 3d ed 2005) (discussing how various land use issues have been resolved by voting). 
2 See generally William A. Fischel, Neither "Creatures of the State" nor "Accidents of Geo- 
graphy": The Creation of American Public School Districts in the Twentieth Century, 11 U Chi L 
Rev 177 (2010) (examining the history of school consolidation). 
3 See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr and David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using 
Noncumulative Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 11 U Chi L Rev 249 (2010) 
(arguing that the traditional justifications for industrial zoning districts are not compelling). 
4 See generally Christopher Serkin, Entrenching Environmentalism: Private Conservation 
Easements over Public Land, 11 U Chi L Rev 341 (2010) (observing how conservation easements have 
been used to entrench land use regulations and make them difficult for future lawmakers to repeal). 
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(TIF).5 I add to the list by presenting a case study from New Haven, 
Connecticut, in which direct voting by property owners was used to de- 
termine whether to establish a historic preservation district. I also consid- 
er whether direct local voting might be adopted to decide controversies 
about using eminent domain to promote economic development. 
I reach three principal conclusions. First, when direct voting is 
used to resolve local controversies, restricting the franchise to proper- 
ty owners is a promising strategy for assuring that voters are suffi- 
ciently informed and motivated to render a decision that accords with 
the preferences of the members of the community. Making votes pro- 
portional to property holdings is not necessary or even desirable in all 
cases: a rule of one-owner, one-vote may have greater legitimacy. 
Second, direct voting should be limited to proposals in which the ben- 
efits and costs are largely internalized to the voting community. When 
significant costs are likely to be borne by those outside the communi- 
ty, direct voting may be more prone to NIMBYism6 than other deci- 
sional mechanisms. Third, direct voting works best when the stakes for 
members of the community are high and relatively uniform. This mi- 
nimizes the risk of either majoritarian abuse or minoritarian capture, 
both of which may be of greater concern when direct voting is used 
relative to other decisional mechanisms. These conclusions can serve 
as a basis for determining, within a comparative institutional choice 
framework, when direct voting is a promising alternative to more con- 
ventional mechanisms of collective choice. 
I. Local Direct Democracy: Promise and Pitfalls 
Local governments provide a variety of collective goods ranging 
from streets and sidewalks to law enforcement to land use controls. 
The general question I explore is whether and under what conditions 
direct voting by local citizens can be an effective tool for resolving 
conflicts over the provision of these local collective goods. I begin by 
considering in the abstract why direct democracy is a potentially at- 
tractive mechanism for resolving local political disputes and also why 
it presents certain pitfalls. This sets the stage for considering how di- 
rect voting should be structured in resolving local controversies and 
5 See generally Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and 
the Political Economy of Local Government, 11 U Chi L Rev 65 (2010) (discussing why tax in- 
crement financing has become so widespread). 
6 See Part I.B.2. 
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why limiting the vote to property owners makes sense in this context. I 
begin with three advantages and then consider three pitfalls. 
A. The Advantages of Direct Democracy 
1. The wisdom of many minds. 
The most intriguing advantage of direct democracy is that it may 
result in better decisions than other mechanisms, such as representative 
democracy (for example, a city council), delegated administrative au- 
thority (for example, a zoning board), or judicial review (for example, 
courts interpreting broad constitutional provisions). The argument can 
be framed in terms of the "many minds" theorem that has recently at- 
tained a degree of prominence in political science and public law scho- 
larship.7 Originally credited to the Marquis de Condorcet and often 
called the Condorcet Jury Theorem or just the Jury Theorem,8 the ar- 
gument posits that under certain limiting conditions, the larger the 
group making a decision, the more likely the decision will be correct. A
common illustration is provided by experiments in which people are 
asked to guess how many jelly beans are in a jar: the larger the number 
of persons guessing, the closer the average guess comes to being correct. 
What are the limiting conditions for ensuring that many minds are 
better than fewer minds? There are basically three. First, the competence 
of the voters must be sufficiently high that the average voter is more like- 
ly to get the answer right than wrong. Second, voters must cast their votes 
independently of each other, in the sense that no one's vote is required by 
the vote of any other. Third, voters must have the same understanding of 
the choices before them on which they are voting.9 
7 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds: Why the Founding 
Document Doesn't Mean What It Meant Before 7-10 (Princeton 2009) (discussing the application of 
"many minds" arguments to constitutional interpretation); Adrian Vermeule, Law and the Limits of 
Reason 25-55 (Oxford 2009) (summarizing the various versions of the "many minds" argument and 
expressing skepticism regarding its utility beyond hypothetical scenarios); Cass R. Sunstein, Infoto- 
pia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge 195-203 (Oxford 2006) (describing how tools like Wiki- 
pedia and prediction markets can successfully aggregate the information held by "many minds" into 
a useful and novel creation); James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds 22, 36-39, 41-43, 70-72 
(Doubleday 2004) (outlining the conditions- diversity, independence, and decentralization- that 
make many minds more likely to come to a good conclusion than a single mind). 
8 See Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J 
Legal Stud 327, 327-29 (2002). 
9 See Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J Legal Analysis 1, 5-6, 9 
(2009) (explaining that the Jury Theorem requires that the group's "mean competence is better 
than random[,]" that there is "independence of the group members' views or guesses[J" and "inso- 
far as [one is] interested in the aggregation of judgments . . . the group members must be asking the 
same question"). See, for example, Sunstein, Infotopia at 25-26 (cited in note 7) (applying the 
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Other conditions that one might think are necessary for the Jury 
Theorem to hold evidently are not. It is not necessary that each voter 
be sufficiently competent and well informed that he is more likely to 
be right than wrong. It is only necessary that on average voters are 
more likely to be right or wrong. More accurate decisions will be 
reached by expanding the number of voters, even if quite a few voters 
are ignorant of the facts or hold bizarre views.10 Nor it is necessary that 
every voter have the same information about the pros and cons of the 
issue, just that they agree about what it is they are voting on.1 
It is also not necessary- and this is especially important- that 
there be some objective right answer to the question on which voting 
takes place, like the number of beans in a jar. The Jury Theorem also 
works if each voter is asked which choice will best promote her prefe- 
rences about different outcomes.12 If each voter is asked to choose 
which outcome best advances her preferences, then the aggregate vote 
will tell us "which collective choice will maximize satisfaction of the 
preferences of the majority."13 This characteristic, in particular, means 
that the Jury Theorem is potentially adaptable to disputes in which 
conflicting value judgments and differing predictions about future 
effects are at play- in short, to controversies over the provision of 
local collective goods. 
If the conditions of the Jury Theorem hold, one can readily see how 
direct voting would be superior to other decisional mechanisms inresolv- 
ing local controversies. Direct voting entails "more minds" being devoted 
to the task at hand than does representative oting by a local legislative 
body, or action taken by an administrative board, or a ruling by a court. 
This will be a particular advantage if the decision turns heavily on infor- 
mation about local values and facts on the ground. 
2. Democratic legitimacy. 
A second advantage of direct democracy is that it generates deci- 
sions that are perceived as being legitimate because they are an ex- 
pression of community will. The Supreme Court's decision in City of 
theorem in explaining the credibility and corresponding popularity of Zagat guides which are an 
aggregation of consumer survey answers). 
10 See Vermeule, Limits of Reason at 28 (cited in note 7). 
11 Id at 32. 
12 Edelman, 31 J Legal Stud at 332-33 (cited in note 8) (noting that under the "polling 
model" of the theorem we can just assume "that what is considered right is the answer that the 
majority of all voters would pick"). 
13 Vermeule, Limits of Reason at 32 (cited in note 7). 
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Eastlake v Forest City Enterprises" provides a classic expression of this 
perspective. The Court there upheld against a constitutional challenge a 
city ordinance requiring that all zoning changes be approved by a 55 
percent vote in a local referendum.15 Thedemocratic pedigree of direct 
voting, the Court said, is superior to that of ordinary legislation. "Under 
our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who . 
. . can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which 
might otherwise be assigned to the legislature."16 A local referendum, 
the Court said, "is the city itself legislating through its voters- an exer- 
cise by the voters of their traditional right ... to [determine] . . . what 
serves the public interest."17 In short, resolving local controversies by 
direct voting "is a classic demonstration f'devotion to democracy.'"18 
Whether or not these sentiments are correct as a matter of consti- 
tutional theory,19 they are an accurate reflection of popular beliefs. We 
pride ourselves in being a democracy, and the closer a decision comes to 
being made by "the people themselves," the stronger its democratic 
credentials.20 
Given the perception that direct democracy reflects the common 
will, it is a particularly useful tool for resolving sharply contested is- 
sues that elected representatives and administrators may be reluctant 
to decide themselves. Often local decisions have the aspect of "tragic 
choices," in the sense that they involve clashes between incommensu- 
rate values that cannot be easily compromised and are likely to be 
I4 426 US 668 (1976). 
!5 Id at 679. 
16 Id at 672-73 (observing that this reservation of power is the basis for things like town 
hall meetings, which are analogous to the referendum process at issue in the case). 
17 Id at 678, quoting Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v Union City, 424 
F2d 291, 294 (9th Cir 1970) (discussing the constitutionally favored position that referendum 
procedures traditionally occupy). 
18 Forest City Enterprises, 426 US at 679, quoting James v Valtierra, 402 US 137, 141 (1971). 
19 The argument has been made, for example, that direct democracy is unconstitutional 
under the Guarantee Clause, US Const Art IV, § 4, which guarantees the states a "Republican 
form of government." See, for example, Catherine A. Rogers and David L. Faigman, "And to the 
Republic for Which It Stands": Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 Hastings 
Const L Q 1057, 1058-59 (1996); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican 
Government": The Campaign against Homosexuality, 72 Or L Rev 19, 39-44 (1993). 
20 Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 
47 (Oxford 2004) (explaining that even James Madison- who was highly skeptical of "popular 
constitutionalism"- believed that it is the people who ultimately "declare [the Constitution's] 
true meaning and enforce its observance"). See also Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct 
Democracy, 99 Yale L J 1503, 1513-31 (1990) (discussing conceptions of direct democracy as an 
authoritative expression of majority will, as well as significant problems with this conception). 
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irreversible once taken.21 Such agonizing decisions may be particularly 
difficult for government officials to make, since some people will be 
angry whichever way they choose. This, arguably, makes such tragic 
choices good candidates for resolution through direct voting, where 
the people sit collectively as a kind of jury that reaches decisions that 
are difficult toresolve by reasoned argument or policy analysis, given 
the conflicting values at stake. 
There is admittedly a tension between this second advantage of 
direct democracy- rendering decisions that are seen as legitimate ex- 
pressions of the community will- and the first advantage previously 
discussed- achieving decisions that more accurately reflect he collec- 
tive preferences of the community. As Frank Michelman has sug- 
gested, the two justifications reflect competing models of local gov- 
ernment legitimacy.22 The Jury Theorem presupposes that "all substan- 
tive values or ends" are "strictly private and subjective."23 Local deci- 
sional mechanisms from this perspective should be devised to maxim- 
ize the satisfaction of these individual subjective preferences. The em- 
phasis on self government, by contrast, "depends at bottom on a belief 
in the reality- or at least the possibility- of public or objective values 
and ends for human action."24 From this perspective, local decisional 
mechanisms should be structured so as to foster collective delibera- 
tion about the nature of these objective values and ends. 
At a more practical evel, the two advantages have different im- 
plications for how direct voting might be structured. The many minds 
perspective of the Jury Theorem suggests that the key variable is to 
assure that voters are sufficiently well informed and motivated that 
their judgments are more likely than not to be correct. This suggests 
limiting the size of the voting pool in ways that increase the likelihood 
that those who vote are competent in the relevant sense. The communi- 
ty self-determination advantage, by contrast, suggests that the key vari- 
able is inclusiveness, uch that the outcome can be said to be one that 
21 See Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 17 (Norton 1978). Calabresi and 
Bobbitt do not define "tragic choices" in their book. Based on their examples, such as allocating 
scarce kidney dialysis machines among potential users, I infer that tragic choices are collective 
decisions that require choosing between incommensurate values that cannot be easily compro- 
mised (for example, by splitting the difference) and are likely to be irreversible. 
22 Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing 
Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind L J 145, 148-57 (1977-1978). 
23 Id at 148 (discussing that in this model, the legislature becomes a "market-like arena" 
with votes, rather than money, serving as the medium of exchange). 
24 Id at 149 (discussing that in this model, the legislature now becomes the forum tasked 
with identifying and achieving these ends). 
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reflects the full spectrum of membership in the community. This sug- 
gests expanding the size of the voting pool in line with the principle of 
universal suffrage. Some compromise in the nature of the franchise may 
therefore be necessary in order to tap into both advantages. 
3. Incorruptibility. 
A third advantage of direct democracy is that it is corruption free, 
in the broadest sense that includes not just bribery and extortion, but 
any kind of special interest influence. Key to this is the use of the se- 
cret ballot. If the choice of the individual voter is shielded from public 
exposure, then it is nearly impossible to buy votes. As an Arkansas 
court once explained, the secret ballot "checks bribery through the 
uncertainty that the bribed party will vote as he promised."25 Virtually 
any other decisional mechanism will be more susceptible to special 
interest influence. A variety of inducements can be dangled before 
city council members and zoning commissioners inan effort o adopt 
or block controversial local proposals. Even state court judges are not 
immune from outside influence, specially if they must stand for peri- 
odic election.26 The decisions of city councils, zoning boards, and state 
courts are publicly reported, which facilitates monitoring by the "bri- 
ber" of the "bribed." 
B. The Pitfalls of Direct Democracy 
Against these advantages of direct democracy weigh some well- 
known pitfalls. 
1. Voter ignorance. 
The first pitfall, voter ignorance, is simply the inverse of the Jury 
Theorem. The Theorem shows that if voters, on average, are more like- 
ly than not to choose correctly, then as the number of voters increases, 
the probability of a majority reaching the correct result approaches 
certainty. If this condition is reversed, and the average voter is more 
likely than not to choose incorrectly, then as the number of voters in- 
25 Jones v Glidewell, 13 SW 723, 725 (Ark 1890) (holding that voters cannot be deprived of 
their legal right to a secret ballot). See also Burson v Freeman, 504 US 191, 203 (1992) (noting 
that the secret ballot has been advocated for "its usefulness in preventing bribery, intimidation, 
disorder, and inefficiency at the polls"). 
26 See, for example, Caperton v AT Massey Coal Co, 129 S Ct 2252, 2263-64 (2009) (over- 
turning a state court decision in which one participating judge had been elected with the support 
of $3 million from an officer of a corporation that was a party to the case). 
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creases, the probability of the majority reaching an incorrect result 
approaches certainty. The prospect of using direct democracy to 
achieve results that maximize satisfaction of preferences is thus criti- 
cally dependent on voters having sufficient information about their 
options, and being sufficiently motivated to draw upon that informa- 
tion, in order to satisfy the condition that the average voter is more 
likely than not to decide correctly. 
There are many possible sources of voter ignorance and apathy. If 
each voter has a relatively small stake in the outcome, then voters will 
have little incentive to invest ime and effort in gathering information 
about the issue, and indeed will have little incentive to participate in 
the voting at all. One reason voters may have a small stake in the out- 
come is because the voter's probability of affecting the outcome is 
small. This gives rise to the paradox that although larger numbers of 
voters produce better answers in theory, as the number of voters in- 
creases, the incentives of voters to inform themselves falls, making it 
more likely that voters will be poorly informed. After a point, increas- 
ing the size of the voting pool may in fact produce worse outcomes.27 
One implication of this is that direct democracy should not be used in 
large polities like the nation or the state (as in California's notorious 
initiatives) but should be reserved for local issues where the number 
of voters is much smaller. 
Voters may also have small stakes if the issue under consideration 
does not have a great impact on the individual voter's welfare. If the 
voter does not perceive that much rides on the outcome, then the vot- 
er is likely to remain rationally ignorant about the issue, even if the 
number of voters is small.28 For example, if the issue is whether to buy 
a new fire truck, voters will likely have little incentive to inform them- 
selves about the relevant variables, even in a small town. This suggests 
another implication, which is that direct democracy should be re- 
served for issues of relatively high importance or public salience and 
should not be used to address issues of routine governance. 
Where the stakes for voters are low, either because of a low 
probability of affecting the outcome or small individual stakes or both, 
other distortions are likely to enter the picture. Even if most voters 
have low stakes, some will have high stakes. For example, the members 
27 See Vermeule, Limits of Reason at 44 (cited in note 7) (noting the "possibility that com- 
petence might be endogenous to numbers") (emphasis omitted). 
28 Consider Elizabeth Garrett and Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters Make Laws: How 
Direct Democracy Is Shaping American Cities, 13 Pub Works Mgmt & Pol 39, 42 (2008) (observing 
that when bond issues appear on a ballot without other major issues, voter turnout will be lower). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 20:38:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2010] Direct Voting by Property Owners 283 
of the fire department will have a disproportionate interest in whether 
the city gets a new fire truck, even if most voters do not. Where the 
stakes are skewed in this fashion, the voting pool will be distorted by 
selection effects, either in terms of who votes or how much informa- 
tion different groups of voters have.29 If some interest groups have 
disproportionate stakes in the controversy, they may engage in adver- 
tising or get-out-the-vote campaigns, with the result that voter opi- 
nions may become a function of which group has a larger budget for 
electioneering efforts. 
° 
Again, the lesson would seem to be that direct 
democracy should be limited to relatively small communities on issues 
of relatively high uniform importance. 
2. Exaggerated NIMBYism. 
The second pitfall is that direct voting can exacerbate the tenden- 
cy of local governments to engage in NIMBYism- the "not in my 
backyard" syndrome. NIMBYism is ubiquitous in local government. 
All local governments have a tendency to try to capture benefits for 
their constituents and export costs to those living elsewhere. Some- 
times the phenomenon is obvious: any local governing body is likely 
to conclude that halfway houses for recovering drug addicts hould be 
located in some other community. Often it is more subtle: minimum 
lot size requirements, for example, may be a way of excluding lower 
income households that impose a disproportionate burden on local 
29 See Vermeule, Limits of Reason at 45-46 (cited in note 7); Garrett and McCubbins, 13 
Pub Works Mgmt & Pol at 42 (cited in note 28). See also Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct 
Democracy?, 4 U Chi Roundtable 17, 18 (1997) (noting that special interests play an important 
role in the debate over ballot measures because they often determine what issues will be placed 
on the ballot and how these ballot measures will be written). 
30 Multiple studies have revealed that special interest spending often influences statewide 
initiatives. See generally Larry J. Sabato, Howard R. Ernst, and Bruce A. Larson, eds, Dangerous 
Democracy?: The Battle over Ballot Initiatives in America (Rowman & Littlefield 2001) (survey- 
ing the scholarship and various seminal studies in political science and law on the initiative 
process and its defects). Groups with high stakes in the outcome and the budgets to fund their 
efforts can pay for advertising and professional canvassing efforts. See, for example, Stephen P. 
Nicholson, The Political Environment and Ballot Proposition Awareness, 47 Am J Polit Sci 403, 
403-10 (2003) (finding that information distortions can preclude voters from making reasoned 
and informed decisions at the ballot box); Garrett, 4 U Chi Roundtable at 23 (cited in note 29) 
(discussing the distorting influence of special interest spending in statewide initiatives). They can 
also afford to place issues on the ballot in the first place, which can be an expensive business in 
some states. See Todd Donovan, et al, Contending Players and Strategies: Opposition Advantages 
in Initiative Elections, in Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J. Tolbert, eds, Citizens as 
Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States 80, 94 (Ohio State 1998) (reporting that the 
average qualification cost for placing a proposition on the ballot in California was over $1 mil- 
lion by the mid-1990s). 
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schools and social services.31 The critical point for present purposes is 
not that direct voting causes NIMBYism, but that it is likely to exag- 
gerate the problem of NIMBYism if used to resolve issues having sig- 
nificant extraterritorial effects. 
The point here stands in contraposition to the second advantage 
of direct voting: the superior legitimacy that comes from a decision 
made by the people themselves. Direct voting cannot claim superior 
legitimacy when used to decide questions that have significant effects 
on persons who are outside the community and who thus are not al- 
lowed to vote. An extreme example would be a local vote to dam a riv- 
er, with the effect of denying water to all downstream communities. This 
will hardly be regarded as legitimate by the downstream communities. 
They may in fact view it as uniquely illegitimate and perceive it as a 
direct expression of desire by one community to exploit another. 
The point here also relates to the third advantage of direct voting: 
the incorruptibility of direct democracy. This incorruptibility comes 
from the fact that direct voting, at least by secret ballot, eliminates the 
ability to contract. But where local governmental decisions have sig- 
nificant external effects outside the community, contracting provides a 
potential solution to extraterritorial effects. Interest groups outside 
the community may be able to strike bargains with elected officials or 
administrative personnel within the community to induce them to 
modify their decisions o as to take extraterritorial interests into ac- 
count. In other words, elected or appointed officials may enter into 
Coasean bargains with outside groups that mitigate the extraterritori- 
al effects.32 Local voters casting secret ballots cannot do this. 
Suppose the issue is whether to permit a new landfill for garbage 
in a local community. The landfill will impose costs on the communi- 
ty-if only the psychic costs to residents in knowing that they live in 
the kind of place where landfills are located.33 At the same time, the 
31 Lawrence G. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the 
Indigent, 21 Stan L Rev 767, 794-95 (1969) (recognizing that minimum floor space and lot size 
requirements will lead to a lesser demand on welfare programs and schools). See also, for exam- 
ple, Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale L 
J 385, 390-403 (1977) (discussing the methods by which communities can limit new housing 
construction and the effect these methods have on housing prices). See generally William A. 
Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 Urban Stud 
317, 317-40 (2004) (analyzing the history of exclusionary zoning). 
32 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960). 
33 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of SWANCC: Federalism and the Politics of Locally 
Unwanted Land Uses, in Richard J. Lazarus and Oliver A Houck, eds, Environmental Law Stories 
283, 290-92, 316-18 (Foundation 2005) (providing a history of opposition to the construction of a 
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landfill will yield significant benefits to garbage-generating residents 
throughout a larger geographic area, such as the county in which the 
community is located. Suppose the cost-benefit equation is negative 
for the local community but positive for the county as a whole. If the 
decision whether to permit the construction of the landfill is put to a 
local vote, the outcome can easily be predicted: local voters will say, 
"Not in my backyard, thank you very much." If the decision is made 
by local officials the outcome may be the same. But it is also possible 
that the entity proposing to construct the landfill may be able to per- 
suade local officials to act in the interest of the county, rather than the 
local community. It might be able to do so by "bribing" the local offi- 
cials with campaign contributions or promises of reciprocal political 
support on other issues. Or, it might be able to do so by offering to 
provide certain offsetting benefits to the community, such as the con- 
struction of a new school or a park, in effect transferring some of the 
gains obtained from the landfill operation to community residents, in 
order to overcome their opposition.34 
The point is not that Coasean bargains are a particularly effective 
way of solving extraterritorial spillover effects. As Clay Gillette has 
shown, the barriers to interjurisdictional b rgaining are many.35 The 
point is simply that when decisions are made by local direct voting, 
Coasean bargains are ruled out. Optimal jurisdictional scope thus be- 
comes all the more important. The clear implication is that direct vot- 
ing should not be used to decide on proposals whose costs or benefits 
will be borne largely by persons outside the community. 
3. Exaggerated majoritarian (and minoritarian) bias. 
Like NIMBYism, another pervasive difficulty associated with lo- 
cal government is what Neil Komesar calls majoritarian and minorita- 
rian bias.36 Majoritarian bias occurs when majorities use their superior 
voting strength to exploit minorities; minoritarian bias occurs when mi- 
new landfill in Bartlett, Illinois and noting that some of this opposition may have been due to a 
perception that richer communities were dumping their garbage on lower-income areas). 
34 See, for example, Vicki Been, "Exit " as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking 
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum L Rev 473, 517-28 (1991) (suggesting that 
people who are deciding where to live act as "consumer-voters" when considering communities' 
public service packages). 
35 See Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 NYU L Rev 190, 
213-19 (2001) (arguing that contracting costs limit interlocal bargaining). 36 See Neil K. Komesar, Law's Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of 
Rights 55-87 (Cambridge 2001) (discussing majoritarian and minoritarian bias in the context of 
zoning). 
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norities use their superior ability to organize for collective action to 
exploit majorities. Jim Crow laws provide a familiar example of majori- 
tarian bias. Licensing laws that restrict entry into occupations provide a 
familiar example of minoritarian bias. Majoritarian and minoritarian 
bias are ubiquitous in government. To a significant degree they are in 
the eye of the beholder, since identifying outcomes as "biased" requires 
specifying an appropriate baseline, which will often be contestable.37 
As in the case of NIMBYism, the concern here is not that direct 
voting causes majoritarian or minoritarian bias, which will always be 
present to some degree. Rather, the concern is that direct voting may 
exacerbate the tendency toward bias relative to what it would be in a 
system in which decisions are made by elected representatives, ap- 
pointed officials, or courts. The crux of the problem is measuring in- 
tensities of preferences.38 Elected and appointed officials (and even 
judges) have ways of assessing not only the numerical support for one 
position versus another but also the intensity with which these prefe- 
rences are held. A position weakly favored by a numerical majority 
will not necessarily be adopted if it is intensely opposed by a minority. 
Nor will a measure favored by a well-organized minority necessarily 
prevail if it opposed by a poorly organized majority. There are a varie- 
ty of reasons for this. Assuming both the majority and minority are 
part of the same political community, government officials may feel an 
obligation to try to maximize the well-being of both groups. Or they 
may realize that they will have repeated interactions over time with 
members of both groups, and that building oodwill with constituents 
requires taking intensities of preferences into account. Or, as noted in 
connection with the discussion of NIMBYism, there may be various 
formal and informal contractual arrangements that intense minorities 
can forge with officials, in order to persuade them not to follow major- 
ity sentiment on a particular issue. 
Each of these tempering forces is missing from direct democracy. 
When voters are asked their views about a policy issue directly, they 
are likely to consider only their own preferences, not the interests of 
the community as a whole. Voters do not have to worry about reelection 
or about forging long-term relationships with groups that may have 
different views. And as previously discussed, voters cannot enter into 
37 See Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 L & Soc Inq 959, 989-90 
(1997). 
38 See Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules: How to interpret Unclear Legislation Z/U-/1 
(Harvard 2008). 
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contracts to modify their votes. Thus, there is reason for concern that 
direct democracy would increase the incidence of majoritarian bias. 
One might think that minoritarian bias would be less likely to oc- 
cur under direct voting, and this will be true for issues as to which vot- 
ers have high enough stakes to inform themselves and participate in 
the voting process. But it is possible to imagine situations where a ma- 
jority of voters has low stakes and a minority has high stakes, with the 
result hat direct voting generates minoritarian bias. Suppose the issue 
is whether to raise the pay of teachers in the local public schools by 
10 percent. School teachers will understand the significance of the 
proposal well, and they and their families and friends will be highly 
motivated to turn out for the vote. But the majority may not be suffi- 
ciently motivated to inform themselves of the implications (for exam- 
ple, for future tax increases) or to bother to vote. The result may be 
that the minority with high-stakes votes in large numbers and in a way 
that favors its interests, whereas the majority with low stakes has low 
turnout and votes more randomly. If the measure passes, it may be 
reflective of minoritarian bias. 
The implications of majoritarian bias would seem to be that direct 
voting should be avoided, if possible, where the issue is one in which 
weak majoritarian preferences are pitted against intense minoritarian 
preferences. The implications of minoritarian bias for direct voting are 
similar to the implications drawn from considering the pitfall of voter 
ignorance: direct voting should be limited to issues where the stakes are 
relatively high and uniformly distributed among local voters. 
II. The Connecticut Historic Districts Act and the 
Proposed Saint Ronan-Edgehill Historic District 
To provide a concrete example of local direct voting in operation, 
I examine a recent controversy in New Haven, Connecticut, about 
whether to create a neighborhood historic preservation district. This 
would have imposed legal restraints on exterior modifications of 
structures, thereby helping to preserve the distinctive architectural 
ambience of the neighborhood- a kind of local collective good. But it 
would have done so at the cost of restricting individual owner auton- 
omy. The statute that governed the decision required an affirmative 
vote of two-thirds ofneighborhood property owners. 
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The Connecticut Historic Districts Act was adopted in substan- 
tially its present form in 1965.39 Under the Act, the city council or 
mayor appoints a study committee to investigate and issue a written 
report on the desirability of establishing a historic preservation dis- 
trict.40 The report is submitted to the Connecticut Commission on Cul- 
ture and Tourism and the local zoning commission for their comments 
and recommendations.41 Copies of the report and recommendations are 
then submitted to each owner of record of real property in the pro- 
posed district.42 Anopen public meeting is convened to discuss the pro- 
posal.43 If the study committee decides to go forward after considering 
the comments at the public meeting, the municipal clerk mails sealed 
ballots to all owners of record of property in the district.44 Each owner 
of property having an assessed property tax valuation of at least $1,000 
on which property taxes were paid in the previous year is entitled to 
one vote.45 Co-owners cast fractional votes equal to their percentage 
ownership interest, and no owner is entitled to more than one vote.46 
If two-thirds of all property owners voting approve the creation 
of a district, he matter is submitted to the city council for its considera- 
tion.47 The city council can enact an ordinance establishing the proposed 
historic district, reject the proposal giving a statement of reasons, or re- 
turn the proposal to the study committee for consideration of amend- 
ments.48 Anaffirmative vote of two-thirds ofproperty owners is therefore 
a condition precedent for the adoption of a historic district but does not 
itself have any legal force. The action that creates the district isthe ordin- 
ance adopted by the city council. The statute contains no procedure for 
abolishing a historic district once one has been created. 
The consequences of establishing a historic district are significant. 
Once a historic district is approved, it is subject to the oversight of a 
39 Conn Gen Stat Ann §§ 7-147a-y (West). For further background and another case study 
involving the application of the statute in New Haven, see Tad Heuer, Living History: How 
Homeowners in a New Local Historic District Negotiate Their Legal Obligations, 116 Yale L J 
768,777-85(2007). 
40 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147b. 
41 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147b(c). 
42 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147b(e). 
43 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147b(d) (requiring that the Commission's comments and rec- 
ommendations must be read "in full" at this hearing). 
44 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147b(g). 
45 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147b(g). 
46 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147b(g) (providing that corporations have their votes cast by 
the CEO or her désignée). 
47 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147b(i). 
48 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147b(i). 
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historic district commission, composed of five voting members serving 
staggered five year terms.49 This may either be a commission that over- 
sees multiple historic districts within a municipality, or a commission 
created solely for one district. The commission is empowered to re- 
view and approve all proposed "alterations" to the "exterior architec- 
tural features" of all buildings and structures (including signs, fences, 
sidewalks, and walls) in the district.50 Alterations include demolitions, 
erections, or modifications ofbuildings or structures, but do not include 
changes to the color of paint.1 Residents who wish to make an altera- 
tion must submit an application to the commission together with an $85 
application fee, and the commission may require supporting architec- 
tural plans and specifications.52 Unless the commission determines the 
matter is not subject to its approval, the matter is considered at a public 
hearing. If a majority of the commission determines that the alteration 
is acceptable, it issues a certificate ofappropriateness.53 
The commission is empowered to seek injunctions against per- 
sons who violate the ordinance. It is also authorized to ask the local 
superior court to impose fines of up to $100 per day for continuing 
violations of the ordinance, or up to $250 a day for willful violations. 
Any monies collected in such actions "shall be used by the commis- 
sion to restore the affected buildings, structures, or places to their 
condition prior to the violation."54 
The Connecticut Historic Districts Act was recently applied to a 
proposal to make the Saint Ronan-Edgehill neighborhood in New 
Haven, where I then lived, as a protected historic district.55 Located 
49 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147c(d) (noting that such members are not paid for serving on 
the commission). 
50 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147a (defining the scope of the commission's regulatory power). 
51 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147d(c). 
52 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147d(c). 
53 The commission is directed in passing on a proposed alteration to consider "the histori- 
cal and architectural value and significance, architectural style, scale, general design, arrange- 
ment, texture and material of the architectural features involved and the relationship thereof to 
the exterior architectural style and pertinent features of other buildings and structures in the 
immediate neighborhood." Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147f(a). 
54 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 7-147h(b). 
55 The Saint Ronan-Edgehill area was originally created out of two large estates, that of 
the Hillhouse family to the south and that of Whitney clan, of cotton gin fame, to the north. See 
Jim Shelton, Whitneys and Hillhouses Slept Here, New Haven Reg El (Apr 12, 2007). It was 
subdivided in stages starting in the late nineteenth century, with the most intensive development 
occurring in the period from 1900 to 1929. The houses are architecturally unique; their designs 
were commissioned by New Haven's elite, with manufacturers, professionals, and Yale professors 
represented in roughly equal numbers. Colonial Revival is the most prevalent architectural style, 
with Queen Anne style, Gothic Revival, Shingle style, Arts and Crafts, and Tudor Revival also 
represented. According to the Historic District Commission's study report: "These distinguished 
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north of the Yale University campus between Whitney Avenue and 
Prospect Avenue, this is one of New Haven's most desirable residen- 
tial neighborhoods. The proposed district included over 280 homes 
and several institutional facilities, including the Yale Divinity School, 
three grammar schools, three churches, and the Connecticut Agricul- 
tural Experimental Station. There are no industrial or commercial 
facilities in the area. Like the rest of New Haven, it is covered by a 
zoning ordinance that regulates uses, setback lines, and the like.56 The 
area in question is generally zoned "RS-1," which permits ingle- 
family residences only.57 
An earlier attempt to create a historic district for the Saint Ro- 
nan-Edgehill neighborhood failed in 1990, when a majority of proper- 
ty owners, but less than the required two-thirds voted to approve the 
proposal.58 A second attempt was launched in 2005. According to the 
study report, 
[Residents became concerned that the neighborhood might not 
continue to preserve its many historically and architecturally sig- 
nificant buildings and streetscapes while under pressure from de- 
velopment. Neighbors expressed growing concern that lots would 
be excessively subdivided, institutions would encroach, and dis- 
tinguished historical buildings would be torn down and replaced 
by McMansions of no historical or architectural merit.59 
The proposal to adopt a historic district followed the script laid 
down by the Connecticut statute. The New Haven Historic District 
Commission appointed a study committee. The committee obtained 
grants funding the effort and hired an architectural historian to write a
handsome study report, featuring colored photos and capsule histories 
of each house in the area. The study committee unanimously recom- 
mended the creation of a historic district. This was in turn endorsed by 
the New Haven Historic District Commission. 
and eclectic buildings, are within a setting of broad streets, spacious lots, and mature trees. This 
setting itself contributes to the St. Ronan-Edgehill District's overall unity of architectural ex- 
pression." St. Ronan-Edgehill Neighborhood Study Committee, Study Report: St. Ronan-Edgehill 
Historic District 18 (Apr 2008) ("St. Ronan Study Report"). 
56 See City of New Haven, Connecticut, Ordinance No 1565 (Apr 7, 2008) (establishing 
zoning districts for the City of New Haven). 
57 See New Haven, Connecticut, City Zoning Map, online at 
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/CityPlan/pdfs/Regulations/Zoning_Fullsize_Map_Index.pdf 
(visited Nov 8, 2009). 
58 St. Ronan Study Report at 1 (cited in note 55). 
59 Id. 
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As the public meeting approached, it became clear that the 
neighborhood was divided on the proposal, as it had been in 1989- 
1990. While proponents cited fears of subdivisions and McMansions, 
opponents said they feared oversight by the "taste police" and opined 
that the additional degree of restriction would "hurt property val- 
ues."60 As the voting grew near, political activity among the residents 
intensified. Dueling emails circulated among members of the neigh- 
borhood association.61 Proponents and opponents disagreed about 
whether local contractors regarded the commission approval process, 
as it applied in other New Haven historic districts, to be burdensome. 
Opponents pointed out that the concerns cited in the study report 
about subdivisions and teardowns were purely hypothetical and were 
already regulated by the zoning laws. Opponents also highlighted am- 
biguities about what sorts of exterior alterations would be subject to 
commission approval, voicing concerns that, for example, replacing a 
concrete driveway with asphalt would be subject to commission veto. 
Proponents countered that the commission had approved two-thirds 
of the requests made in other historic districts, usually on the first 
meeting. They also reported that the commission had promised to re- 
vise its guidelines to make them more "user friendly."62 
By the time voting began, both proponents and opponents were 
canvassing door to door and convening small groups of neighbors to 
discuss the pros and cons of a historic district. Although the issue re- 
ceived relative little attention in the local media and attracted no pub- 
lic advertising, there is little doubt that virtually every property owner 
in the proposed district was aware of the issue and the arguments for 
and against its adoption. 
When the ballots were counted in the clerk's office, under the 
watchful eyes of ten residents, everyone seemed surprised by the re- 
sult: the proposal was rejected by a margin of two-to-one.63 This was 
significantly less support than the previous proposal had garnered in 
1990. Published accounts offered few explanations for the outcome. 
60 Randall Beach, Edgehill Residents to Meet on District Plan, New Haven Reg Al 
(May 12, 2008). 
61 Randall Beach, Debate Rages over Proposed St. Ronan- Edgehill Historic District, New 
Haven Reg A3 (Sept 6, 2008) (reporting, for example, that one member expressed fear in an 
email that adoption of a historic district would create "significant red tape" for contractors, while 
another member countered that "[a]t [a] public hearing, people who had done renovation in 
other historic districts didn't say their contractors were unhappy"). 
62 id. 
63 Randall Beach, Voters Reject Historic District, New Haven Reg A3 (Sept 24, 2008). A 
total of 124.89 "no" votes and 63.2 "yes" votes were cast out of approximately 188 votes total. Id. 
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One member of the study committee "attributed the loss to changing 
demographics of the neighborhood," noting that the area was less sta- 
ble and turnover was higher than it had been in earlier years.64 Wheth- 
er this is accurate is unclear. One of the leading opponents said that 
the loss was not due to any disagreement over neighborhood values, 
but simply to the perception that the creation of a historic district was a 
"divisive" idea.65 Perhaps the most straightforward explanation was that 
the affirmative case was based on speculative harms like subdivisions 
and teardowns, which had yet to materialize; meanwhile opponents 
could cite tangible and immediate costs that would be incurred in com- 
plying with the commission approval process. Tangible costs evidently 
weighed more heavily in the minds of property owners worried about 
preserving their property values than did speculative benefits. 
In any event, although the proponents of the historic district were 
clearly disappointed, they seemed to accept the judgment of the voters 
as definitive. No one expected to see a third attempt to create a histor- 
ic district.66 Importantly, no one questioned the integrity of the ballot- 
ing process or threatened litigation. In short, the rejection of the pro- 
posal, however disappointing to those who had fought to achieve it, 
was accepted as a legitimate resolution. 
III. Lessons for Direct Voting 
The Saint Ronan-Edgehill controversy offers a number of lessons 
about how direct voting might be structured so as to maximize its ad- 
vantages and minimize its disadvantages as a tool for resolving dis- 
putes over the provision of local collective goods. Four features in par- 
ticular stand out as being crucial in explaining the apparent success of 
direct voting in this particular instance. First, the franchise was re- 
stricted to property owners, thereby assuring that all voters had a high 
stake in the correct resolution of the controversy. Second, although 
only property owners could vote, each owner was limited to one vote, 
thereby giving each owner an equal voice in the outcome. Third, the 
issue was one as to which the benefits and costs were overwhelmingly 
internal to the community, minimizing concerns about NIMBYism. 
Fourth, the boundaries of the district were drawn in such a way that 
nearly all owners had similar stakes in the outcome, minimizing con- 
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A. The Property Qualification 
As we have seen, a crucial issue in determining whether direct 
voting is an effective device for resolving local political controversies 
is whether the average voter is likely to be well informed about the 
relevant facts.67 The Connecticut Historic Districts Act contains a 
number of features that are designed to encourage widespread disse- 
mination of information topotential voters. The Act establishes a se- 
ries of stages in the decisional process, each of which is likely to draw 
the attention of voters to the issues. There is the appointment of the 
study committee, the preparation and distribution of the study report, 
the open public meeting, and the climactic vote by secret ballot. The 
study report, which is distributed to all property owners in the district, 
and the public meeting are directly designed to enhance the flow of 
information. Moreover, since everyone understands that a two-thirds 
affirmative ote is critical to the success of a proposed district, both 
proponents and opponents have a powerful incentive to jawbone oth- 
er community members, thereby providing information a d argument 
that will influence their vote. 
The Act is also structured so that the number of persons eligible to 
vote is neither too large nor too small. The many-minds effect promised 
by the Condorcet Jury Theorem requires that the voting pool be larger 
than the number of elected or appointed officials who would otherwise 
resolve the question, so that more minds are devoted to the question. 
At the same time, if the voting pool becomes too large, the stakes for 
individual voters will diminish, and this may weaken voters' incentives 
to become adequately informed. Because the incentives of voters to 
gather information are also a function of the importance of the issue for 
each voter, no mathematical formula can be devised that would tell us 
what the optimal size of the pool would be for all cases. But it would 
appear that the size of the voting pool in the Saint Ronan-Edgehill his- 
toric district relative to the importance of the issue for voters, in which 
approximately 280 properties were eligible for voting and 188 ballots 
were cast, strikes approximately the right balance. 
Notwithstanding these important structural elements, in my view 
the most important feature of the Act, in terms of assuring a well- 
informed and motivated electorate, is the restriction of the franchise 
to property owners. The reasons for this are well developed in Bill 
67 See Sunstein, Infotopia at 28-29 (cited in note 7). 
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FischePs work on the "homevoter hypothesis."68 Homeowners typically 
have a disproportionate amount of their net worth tied up in the value 
of their homes. This makes them extremely sensitive to proposals that 
will affect he value of their homes. Whether for good or ill, the value 
of local collective goods is capitalized in the price of homes. Home 
values are affected positively by local collective goods like good 
schools, low crime rates, and parks. They are affected negatively by 
poor schools, high crime rates, and high property taxes. Given this ca- 
pitalization effect, and their nondiversified wealth, "homevoters" have 
a powerful incentive to inform themselves about any issue that will 
affect local property values, either positively or negatively.69 
This feature explains why granting the franchise to property 
owners, as opposed to all residents, is more likely to produce an in- 
formed voting pool. Some residents who are not property owners, 
such as long-term tenants, may also be well informed about develop- 
ments that affect he quality of neighborhood life, such as the quality 
of the schools. But other non-owning residents, including students 
renting out rooms and live-in household employees, will typically have 
a more tenuous connection to the neighborhood, and will have little 
interest in learning about issues that affect he long-term welfare of 
the community. It would be difficult to devise a test that would diffe- 
rentiate among non-owning residents o as to separate out those who 
will self inform from those who will not. Limiting the franchise to 
owners, by contrast, is likely to select a pool of voters who have a 
strong incentive to inform themselves about any issue that will have a 
significant impact on property values.70 As Fischel has demonstrated, 
this includes virtually every issue involving the provision of local col- 
lective goods.1 
The point, it must be stressed, is not that property owners are 
more virtuous or that their interests are entitled to greater protection 
than those of non-property owners. The point is simply that limiting the 
franchise to property owners is a powerful device for constructing a pool 
of voters that has the requisite information a d motivation tomake cor- 
68 See generally William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis (Harvard 2001) (arguing 
that a homeowner will vote in local elections and community meetings in such a way to maxim- 
ize the value of his home, as the typical person's largest financial asset is his home). 
69 See id at 4-6. 
70 Consider Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U Pa L Rev 
1519, 1548 (1982) (noting that if rents are uncontrolled, landlords may be able to recover gains 
from the provision of new local collective goods in the form of higher rents, leaving tenants 
indifferent to whether such collective goods are provided or not). 
71 See Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis at 45-46 (cited in note 68). 
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rect decisions. Itis not clear that there is any other administratively feasi- 
ble rule that would identify an equally qualified voting pool. If limiting 
the franchise to property owners is deemed unacceptable for reasons of 
political morality or constitutional l w, then it may be that direct voting 
should be abandoned as a tool for resolving local controversies. 
B. One-Owner, One-Vote 
A second important advantage of direct voting, as previously dis- 
cussed, is its legitimacy-conferring effect. This is particularly useful in 
resolving controversies that have the aspect of "tragic hoices," in the 
sense that they require the resolution of incommensurate values in 
circumstances where compromise is difficult and the choice is likely to 
be permanent.72 
The decision whether to adopt a historic preservation district 
shares the central features of a "tragic choice." The dispute, at least in 
the Saint Ronan-Edgehill neighborhood, was over a predictive judg- 
ment about which of two incommensurate effects would predominate: 
preserving the traditional rchitectural qualities of the neighborhood 
or encumbering property owners with needless bureaucratic red tape. 
This dispute was impossible to compromise given the framework 
created by the Connecticut statute: either a historic district would be 
created or not. Finally, it is plausible to think that the decision to 
create a historic district would be irreversible. The Connecticut statute 
includes no procedure for decommissioning a historic district once 
established. While not fatal, this feature would inevitably increase the 
costs of repeal because of legal uncertainty about how to achieve it. 
Thus, the episode supports the supposition that direct voting may be 
an effective way to resolve controversies that are particularly vexing 
and consequential and as to which government officials may be reluc- 
tant to weigh in. 
As we have seen, the legitimacy-conferring aspect of direct voting 
is related to its inclusiveness. From this perspective, one of the intri- 
guing features of the Connecticut Historic Districts Act is that each 
property owner gets just one vote. Those who own large parcels have 
no greater say than those with small holdings; nor do owners of mul- 
tiple parcels get an enhanced voice. If property is owned by multiple 
owners, they get fractional votes. By contrast, voting rules in special 
assessment districts, business improvement districts, and common in- 
terest communities are nearly always proportioned to the extent of 
72 For an explanation of "tragic choices," see note 21. 
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property ownership.73 The rule is $1 of assessed value equals one vote. 
The Connecticut rule, one-owner, one-vote, is considerably more ega- 
litarian. Especially in a neighborhood in which nearly all property is 
owner-occupied single-family residences, a rule of one-owner, one- 
vote is relatively inclusive.4 In fact, the Connecticut rule of one-owner, 
one-vote can be seen as a compromise that taps into both of the first 
two advantages of direct voting. By limiting the vote to property own- 
ers, the statute creates a pool of voters likely to have a strong incentive 
to inform themselves about the issues. Large property owners will pre- 
sumably have slightly more incentive to self-inform than small owners. 
But any one owning some property will have an incentive to gather 
information, and a modest amount of information widely distributed 
may be all that is needed for the Jury Theorem to operate. Meanwhile, 
by limiting each property owner to one vote, the statute makes a signifi- 
cant gesture toward inclusiveness. In giving the franchise to everyone 
owning some property, no matter how small, and weighing everyone's 
vote equally, the statute makes it possible to say that the outcome re- 
flects the will of the entire community, and hence is legitimate. 
C. Local Effects 
A third important feature of the Saint Ronan-Edgehill proposal 
is that the impact of adopting a historic district, at least in this in- 
stance, would fall almost exclusively on those living in the district. 
Neighborhood residents would reap the benefits of enhanced protec- 
tion of architectural and aesthetic values, which would translate into a 
more pleasant environment and higher property values. Neighbor- 
hood residents would also bear the costs of reduced owner discretion 
73 See, for example, Clayton P. Gillette, Voting with Your Hands: Direct Democracy in An- 
nexation, 78 S Cal L Rev 835, 844 (2005) (depicting the use of property-based voting in annexa- 
tions); Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and 
Urban Governance, 99 Colum L Rev 365, 373-76 (1999) (same); Robert C. Ellickson, New Insti- 
tutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 Duke L J 75, 90-95 (1998) (discussing the use of property- 
based voting in various community associations including block improvement districts); Richard 
Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U Chi L Rev 
339, 384 (1993) (discussing the use of property ownership in structuring the vote in business 
improvement districts and other local governance structures); Ellickson, 130 U Pa L Rev at 1539 
(cited in note 70) (discussing voting rights in homeowners associations). I am not suggesting that 
these voting rules are inappropriate in the contexts in which they apply. If persons are being 
taxed or assessed for collective goods in proportion to their property holdings, then it seems only 
appropriate that their voting strength should also be calibrated in proportion to their holdings. 
74 Indeed, as far as I am aware, no one in New Haven, a city filled with persons of highly 
refined sensibilities regarding equality, has ever objected to the historic district voting rule on the 
ground that it gives the franchise exclusively to property owners. 
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and the expense and inconvenience of obtaining commission approval 
for exterior alterations. Of course, one can always cite some external 
effects. Yale students like to jog in the Saint Ronan-Edgehill neigh- 
borhood, and their experiences might be degraded to some small ex- 
tent if they had to lope pass McMansions rather than stately homes 
from the early twentieth century. But these effects are either trivial or 
speculative compared to the primary benefits and costs, which are 
borne by members of the community.75 
The internalization of benefits and costs is relevant o both the 
aggregation of information a d the legitimacy of the decision. On the 
informational front, community internalization means that the infor- 
mational distortions often associated with popular democracy will be 
minimized. Individuals and groups living outside the community will 
have little interest in a proposal whose effects are largely confined to 
the community. Consequently, we would not expect to see advertising 
blitzes or the use of professional canvassing, as is often the case with 
statewide voter initiatives.6 Furthermore, the internalization of costs 
and benefits eliminates any concern that the community is attempting 
to exploit those living elsewhere. 
The fact that there are few identifiable externalities in this in- 
stance does not mean that other cases involving closely similar issues 
will not entail significant external effects. Tad Heuer's study of the City 
Point Historic Preservation District, established in New Haven in 2001, 
reports that the primary motivation for adopting that district was to 
thwart an expansion of Interstate 95, which runs along the boundary of 
the area.7 This of course is NIMB Yism: local property owners wanted to 
75 The creation of a historic district affects only the exterior modification of structures; it 
does not control land use. Thus the creation of a historic district would not affect the quantity of 
housing in the community, for example whether large homes can be converted into multi-family 
units, because this is governed by the zoning laws. As previously noted, the Saint Ronan-Edgehill 
neighborhood is primarily zoned RS-1, which limits construction to single-family homes. Conse- 
quently, the establishment of a historic district would not reduce housing opportunities for those 
living outside the district. 
76 See, for example, Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 100 Colum 
L Rev 731, 734 (2000) (observing that political parties have begun to use the initiative process to 
further their own political agendas); Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democ- 
racy, 11 Tex L Rev 1845, 1851 (1999) (discussing the influence of money on statewide initiatives); 
Garrett, 4 U Chi Roundtable at 23 (cited in note 23) (same); Daniel Hays Lowenstein and Robert 
M. Stern, The First Amendment and Paid Initiative Petition Circulators, 17 Hastings Const L Q 175, 
176 (1989) (recounting how the initiative process is increasingly influenced by out-of-state interests 
employing national, professional advertising and canvassing firms). 
77 See Heuer, 116 Yale L J at 783-84 (cited in note 39). It was not clear how creating a local 
historical district would make it more difficult o expand the interstate highway. This amplifies 
another troubling finding of Heuer- that the residents in the City Point district were poorly 
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export the costs associated with highway travel onto someone else, in 
this case the drivers stalled in traffic jams on the overburdened freeway. 
Comparing the City Point experience and the Saint Ronan-Edgehill 
experience highlights the extremely context-dependent nature of judg- 
ment about whether local decision entails cost exporting. The same reg- 
ulatory choice, applying the same statutory procedure, may involve 
significant cost exporting in one case, but not another. 
D. Uniform Stakes 
The Saint Ronan-Edgehill experience also suggests that issues 
presenting relative uniform stakes for all residents in the community 
are more likely to avoid the dangers of majoritarian and minoritarian 
bias. Generally speaking, the decision to adopt a historic preservation 
district will be one that affects all property owners in the district. Such 
restrictions will very likely have an impact on every owner's property 
values, whether by increasing them (by preserving a uniform and 
pleasing exterior appearance), by decreasing them (by reducing owner 
autonomy and increasing the costs of making renovations), or some 
combination of both. The feature of uniform stakes puts everyone in 
the district in the same boat: the same package of potential benefits 
and costs applies to all. To be sure, some may be affected more than 
others by restrictions on modifying exterior architectural features. 
Someone planning a teardown would be profoundly affected, while a 
neighbor committed to routine maintenance would not be immediate- 
ly affected at all. However, over time, routine maintenance segues into 
projects that apparently would be covered under the Act, such as re- 
surfacing driveways, tuckpointing, and updating exterior lighting fix- 
tures. So the proposal, at least in this instance, appears to have had 
little distributional impact within the neighborhood. 
Obviously, the feature of uniform stakes will not be present in all 
local voting situations. One can easily imagine other proposals- such 
as a freeze on building on undeveloped lots- that would impose high 
costs for some property owners and no costs (and even mild benefits) 
for others. This would create skewed incentives to gather information 
about the proposal, with those most immediately affected having 
strong incentives to inform themselves and participate in the voting 
informed about the legal consequences of establishing a historic district. See id at 789-93. These 
findings are quite likely related. If support for the City Point historic district was driven by a 
mistaken assumption that it would help block expansion of the interstate, then residents may 
have done little to inform themselves about the actual pros and cons of adopting a historic dis- 
trict, leaving them confused when the survey was later taken about its effects. 
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process and others who are only indirectly affected having only weak 
incentives. Itwould also create obvious potential for majoritarian (or 
minoritarian) bias, which would dominate the consideration of the 
merits of the proposal by the burdened owners and might influence 
benefitted owners as well. 
* * * 
I recognize that there are dangers of generalizing from one ex- 
ample. There are a number of features of the Saint Ronan-Edgehill 
experience that may make it difficult to replicate in other contexts. 
The neighborhood is demographically homogenous, the residents are 
generally highly educated, many are active in civic affairs, and turno- 
ver appears to be low, at least by national standards. My assessment, 
however, is that these features, while relevant at the margins, are not 
decisive. The Saint Ronan-Edgehill example suggests that direct vot- 
ing can be an effective method of resolving local political controver- 
sies, provided four limiting conditions are satisfied: the statute limits 
the franchise to property owners, no property owner has more than 
one vote, the benefits and costs of the proposal are largely internal to 
the community, and the issue is one that presents uniform stakes for 
property owners in the community. When these limiting conditions are 
met, there is reason to think that direct voting will yield decisions that 
will maximize satisfaction of community preferences and are likely to 
be perceived by the polity as legitimate. 
IV. Using Local Voting to Resolve Disputes over 
Economic Development Takings 
Could voting by property owners, structured along the lines of 
the Connecticut Historic Districts Act, be adopted to advise local gov- 
ernments about how to resolve even more controversial issues over 
local collective goods, such as whether to the use eminent domain for 
economic development projects?8 
78 By economic development project, I have in mind a project of the sort at issue in Kelo v 
City of New London, 545 US 469, 473-75 (2005) (involving the use of eminent domain to transfer 
property to a development corporation i  an effort to revitalize the area), and Poletown Neigh- 
borhood Council v City of Detroit, 304 NW2d 455, 457 (Mich 1981) (permitting the use of emi- 
nent domain to transfer property to General Motors for use as an assembly plant). The key 
elements are the use of eminent domain to assemble a large tract of land in an economically 
distressed urban area, followed by a transfer of the land to a for-profit commercial entity for 
construction fa new facility that is projected to generate jobs and tax revenues. 
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In many respects, economic development takings present features 
that make them potentially attractive candidates for local direct vot- 
ing. Whether or not it makes sense to use eminent domain for an eco- 
nomic development project may turn critically on local knowledge. 
Among the local issues one might want to resolve include: the physical 
condition of the area selected for development, and its prospects for 
making a positive contribution tothe local economy with and without 
redevelopment; whether suitable alternative tracts of land are availa- 
ble for the project that do not require eminent domain or that would 
require less use of eminent domain to assemble; the risks of undertak- 
ing a development project given the general level of interest among 
potential purchasers in acquiring new properties in the area; whether 
the project has been conceived in a good faith effort o advance the 
welfare of the community or is being driven by some deal between 
developers and political insiders; and how difficult i will be for own- 
ers living in the area who will be forced to relocate to find equivalent 
facilities elsewhere given the amount of compensation they will re- 
ceive. These inquiries will yield different answers in different times 
and places. They also entail predictive judgments that will yield differ- 
ent answers from different observers. All this suggests that many 
minds may do better in resolving the question than fewer minds, 
whether they be elected representatives, economic development 
commissions, or courts engaged in public use inquiries. 
Whether eminent domain should be used to facilitate conomic 
development projects also appears to entail a tragic hoice, of the sort 
that cries out for a more legitimate solution than is likely to be gener- 
ated if the decision is made by elected officials, bureaucrats, or 
judges.9 Any use of eminent domain entails a conflict between two 
values, both of which society honors deeply. On the one hand, society 
respects landowner autonomy in deciding whether to sell or otherwise 
transfer land. Land is protected by what Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed call property rule protection.80 We permit transfer to occur 
only when the owner consents. Eminent domain stands as a jarring 
exception to this principle. While an owner receives an award of com- 
pensation for property given up, computed in accordance with its es- 
79 See Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 Wm & Mary L 
Rev 1849, 1879-84 (2007) (arguing that public opposition to the use of eminent domain for eco- 
nomic development is motivated by a moral instinct hat it is wrong to take property from "inno- 
cent persons for reasons that are distributionally unjust" and transfer it to private parties). 
80 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena- 
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1092 (1972). 
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timated fair market value, he or she is forced by the government to 
give up the land and relocate. On the other hand, eminent domain is 
often necessary in order to advance another competing value- the 
need to overcome barriers to assembly of land in order to provide 
local collective goods.81 If a large tract of land must be assembled for a 
public project, existing owners may hold out, making voluntary as- 
sembly expensive or impossible. These barriers to assembly may re- 
quire recourse to eminent domain. 
This clash of values cannot be easily compromised. If the dispute 
between a landowner and the local community is over the amount of 
compensation- what the fair market value is- then it should be subject 
to compromise, and in fact usually is.82 But if the dispute is over whether 
the use of eminent domain is a permissible "public use,"83 then the dis- 
pute is much more difficult tocompromise. Either the proposed local 
public good is a "public use" or it is not. Legal authorities sharply disag- 
ree about whether the use of eminent domain for economic develop- 
ment projects is a valid public use.84 Thus the application of the power in 
this context is not readily amenable to compromise. 
Finally, the decision to take title to property by eminent domain 
is nearly always irrevocable. The power applies to specific assets like 
land. All land is unique, as both traditional courts of equity and real 
estate brokers have recognized. Furthermore, the assets taken have 
usually been developed with specific improvements, which are also 
usually unique, and the public project ordinarily entails the destruc- 
tion of these improvements. Once property has been taken by eminent 
domain and any improvements destroyed, it is irrevocably lost. In this 
sense eminent domain is different (and more tragic) than other forms 
of government action, such as taxation and certain applications of the 
police power that regulate uses of property. 
We have no direct evidence about how local voting to resolve 
economic development takings would work in practice. If the public is 
asked in opinion polls or in statewide voter initiatives what it thinks 
81 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L Rev 61, 74-76 (1986); 
Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1106-08 (cited in note 80). 
82 Curtis J. Berger and Patrick J. Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look 
into the Practices of Condemnation, 67 Colum L Rev 430, 440-42 (1967). 
83 See US Const Amend V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without 
just compensation."). 
84 Compare Kelo, 545 US at 477-80 (Stevens) (stating that eminent domain may be used 
for economic development as for any other legitimate government purpose) with id at 498-500 
(O'Connor dissenting) (arguing that eminent domain may not be used for economic develop- 
ment unless the property taken is so deteriorated it is imposing harm on the community). 
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about using eminent domain for economic development projects, the 
answer is resoundingly uniform: "no."85 Yet there is reason to believe 
that local voters, having greater familiarity with local conditions and 
the circumstances ofthe taking, might reach more nuanced judgments. 
Janice Nadler, Shari Diamond, and Matthew Patton have undertaken 
a careful study of post-^e/o pinion polling.86 They report, 
Reaction depends on what is taken (whether land or a business 
or a home) and how it will be used. For example, the use of emi- 
nent domain to take vacant land and run-down buildings for a 
school garnered almost uniform support (88%) and minimal out- 
right rejection (7%). Part of this strong support might be ex- 
plained by the minimal harm to the owner because of the nature 
of the property taken- vacant land. When low-value homes ra- 
ther than vacant land would be taken to build a school, support 
dropped from 88% to 33%. Thus, a large proportion of respon- 
dents reject the idea of taking homes, even for an important use. 
The proposed use of the land did affect reactions to takings, 
however. Although using eminent domain to take low-value 
homes to build a school garnered the support of 33% of the res- 
pondents, upport dropped to 7% when low- value homes were to 
be taken to build high- value homes, and to 4% when low-value 
homes were to be taken to build a shopping center. The proposed 
shopping center garnered far more support (55%) when the 
property taken would be vacant land and run-down buildings.87 
The authors conclude: "These results suggest that beneath the vigor- 
ous public opposition to Kelo lay a more nuanced evaluation of gov- 
ernment takings- a complex structure of public attitudes not easily 
gauged at an abstract level by simply measuring attitudes toward emi- 
nent domain in general."88 
Given that opinion polling results vary widely if the abstract 
proposition about using eminent domain is supplemented with just a 
few skeletal facts, it is plausible that voting by local property owners, 
85 See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 
Minn L Rev 2100, 2108-14 (2009) (collecting data on the lopsided and negative public reaction 
to Kelo). 
86 Janice Nadler, Shari S. Diamond, and Matthew M. Patton, Government Takings of Pri- 
vate Property, in Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin, and Patrick J. Egan, eds, Public Opinion and 
Constitutional Controversy 286, 296-306 (Oxford 2008). 
87 Id at 300. 
88 Id at 301. 
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who presumably would be far better informed about the local situa- 
tion, would produce even more divergent responses to the question of 
whether eminent domain should be used for economic development. 
It is also plausible that most economic development projects 
would satisfy the requirement that the benefits and burdens of the 
proposal be internalized to the community. Often, of course, eminent 
domain is used for infrastructural projects like airport expansions and 
highway rights of way. The uncompensated subjective costs associated 
with using eminent domain for these projects are borne locally, but the 
benefits are regional or even national in scope. Local voting would not 
make sense for these kinds of infrastructural projects. Interestingly, how- 
ever, these projects are not controversial; t least no one claims they are 
not legitimate public uses. The controversial uses of eminent domain tend 
to be ones in which both the costs and the purported benefits are local, 
economic development projects being the primary example. When both 
the costs and the benefits are largely confined to the local community, 
local voting becomes a potentially feasible decisional device. 
Where the local voting model breaks down is in the requirement 
that the proposal present uniform stakes for all members of the com- 
munity. Using eminent domain to facilitate an economic development 
project will not affect all local property owners equally. Those whose 
property will be taken may be losers if they experience uncompen- 
sated subjective losses, while those whose property is not taken may 
be winners, at least if the economic development project succeeds in 
creating new jobs and tax revenues for the community. If we assume 
that local voting will be based solely on perceived self-interest, then 
the persons whose property will be taken may vote "no" and their 
neighbors, who stand to benefit, may vote "yes." Assuming the benefit- 
ted neighbors form a majority (or supermajority if that is required), 
then this will be an example of majoritarian bias: the majority is voting 
essentially to expropriate the uncompensated subjective value of the 
minority whose property will be taken for the project. 
This is probably an overly reductionist analysis of the situation, 
however. Social ties formed through interaction among the benefitted 
and burdened in the community will likely temper any impulse to en- 
dorse taking a neighbors' property for less than pressing reasons.89 
89 As Bill Fischel observes, "It is difficult for one neighborhood to use municipal power to 
loot another neighborhood if residents of both shop in the same stores, play in the same Softball 
league, and send their children to the same schools." William A. Fischel, The Political Economy 
of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 
2004 Mich St L Rev 929, 935. 
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And property owners will understand that any decision to take their 
neighbor's property will set a precedent that can be invoked in the fu- 
ture to take someone else's property- including, potentially, their own. 
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to add a further limiting condition 
before adopting local voting by property owners to determine wheth- 
er to use eminent domain for economic development. The revenues to 
compensate owners whose property is taken should come either from 
local taxes or from a source of outside funding that can be used for a 
variety of local purposes.90 If the economic development taking has an 
opportunity cost for local owners whose property is not taken, then the 
redistributive el ment in the picture is greatly attenuated. There is still 
some redistribution: the owners whose property is taken lose any sub- 
jective premium they attach to their property, and the owners whose 
property is benefitted gain the assembly value created by the use of 
eminent domain to overcome fragmentation. Yet the potential for redi- 
stribution is greatly reduced. If the funding is local, either because local 
tax revenues must be used for the project or because a block grant or 
other fungible outside funding must be diverted from other uses, then 
the limiting condition of uniform stakes is at least approximated. 
Before leaving this topic, it is instructive tocompare local voting 
by property owners to the recent proposal of Michael Heller and Rick 
Hills to adopt "Land Assembly Districts" (LADs) to facilitate local 
economic development projects.91 LADs are essentially a collective ac- 
tion mechanism retrofitted onto a neighborhood to facilitate assembly 
of fragmented property ownership so that the neighborhood can be 
"auctioned" to the highest bidder (including the current owners, if they 
are unsatisfied with the prices bid by others). Membership in the LAD 
consists of all property owners whose land will be sold.92 The LAD is 
governed by voting by property owners, with each owner having a vote 
proportionate to the amount of property she has in the district.93 
There are three critical differences between LADs and my local 
voting proposal. First, LADs represent only owners whose property is 
taken, whereas my proposal entails voting by a larger community of 
90 See id at 942^45, 949 (explaining how grants from federal and state governments ear- 
marked for economic development can induce local communities to take property by eminent 
domain when they would not do so if the costs were internalized to the community). 
91 Michael Heller and Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 Harv L Rev 1465, 1469 
(2008) (explaining that the central goal of the LAD, similar to what condominium organizations 
accomplish, is to allow persons who hold legal interests in local land to "collectively decide" 
whether the land should be combined into a larger parcel). 
92 See id. 
93 Id at 1492, 1503-07. 
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which the property to be taken forms a subpart. Second, LADs vote 
only on whether to accept different bids for the property to be taken, 
whereas under my proposal voting would occur on the question of 
whether the taking is a public use, that is, on whether there should be 
a taking for economic development in the first place. Third, voting in 
LADs is proportionate to holdings- one-acre, one-vote or $1 of as- 
sessed value equals one vote- whereas under my proposal each own- 
er gets one vote. 
Local voting by property owners is superior to a LAD, in my opi- 
nion, because it recognizes that the decision whether to proceed with 
a taking of property for economic development is a multidimensional 
problem as to which there is no universally correct answer. There may 
be a correct answer in each individual case, but that answer depends 
on a host of contextually specific questions- about the condition of 
the existing property, its current use (residential versus commercial, 
and so forth), the availability of alternatives, the likelihood that the 
redevelopment project will succeed, whether the project was con- 
ceived in good faith, the relocation options available to displaced 
owners, and so forth. Answering these questions requires detailed lo- 
cal knowledge. 
Heller and Hills's proposal presupposes that the correct answer 
in each case is determined by a wealth maximization test. If a majority 
of property owners concludes it will be better off selling the neighbor- 
hood, then the neighborhood gets sold; otherwise not. This is a more 
contextualized approach than most proposals floating around in the 
legal literature, such as those that would prohibit all takings for eco- 
nomic development. Nevertheless, it ignores the multidimensionality 
of the problem, including its tragic choice aspects, in a way that would 
likely make the LAD proposal politically unacceptable. 
To see that this is so, consider a variation on the economic devel- 
opment taking at issue in Kelo v City of New London™ Assume that 
the proposed redevelopment area comprises twenty acres, most of 
which consists of abandoned factories and warehouses, but which also 
includes a handful of occupied homes. The prospects for the success of 
the plan are dubious, since no developer will take on the project without 
a large subsidy. There is a strong hint of favoritism, given that a major 
corporation with a nearby facility stands to benefit disproportionately 
from the plan. Given the depressed nature of the immediate surround- 
ings, the fair market value of the homes to be taken is low, meaning the 
94 545 US 469 (2005). 
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owners of these homes will not be able to use their compensation awards 
to acquire equivalent properties elsewhere. Assume further, contrary to 
the facts of the case, that he compensation for the takings will come from 
property taxes paid by members of the local community.95 
Under Heller and Hills's plan, the LAD will eagerly agree to be 
sold, provided there is a bidder. The owners of the abandoned facto- 
ries and warehouses will control the LAD, and will accept any price 
that includes ome increment in assembly value above the fair market 
value of their properties. The owners of the homes may be bitterly 
opposed, because the taking will not compensate them for their lost 
subjective value, but they will be outvoted by the factory and ware- 
house owners. (Of course, if the development prospects are dubious 
and there is no subsidy because the funding is from local sources, 
there may be no bidder.) 
If local voting is used, the project will almost surely be rejected. 
Local voters familiar with the area and the history of the project will 
view it with skepticism, both because of its doubtful prospects and 
because of the influence of the uniquely benefitted corporation. They 
will likely identify with the homeowners and will perceive that they 
would be uniquely disadvantaged by the project. Disapproval is espe- 
cially likely given that compensation for the displaced owners must 
come from local tax revenues. Local voters will not want their tax dol- 
lars devoted to a project with a strong probability of failure and du- 
bious distributional implications. 
Given the stylized facts of this example, there is little doubt that 
voting by local property owners reaches the right result, in the sense 
that it is the result most people would reach if fully informed of the 
factual context. We know this because these stylized facts are essen- 
tially what the public understands the facts of the Kelo case to be, ex- 
cept for the added detail about the source of compensation. The pub- 
lic overwhelmingly believes that there should have been no use of 
eminent domain in Kelo. A voting mechanism that promises to reach 
the opposite result in similar circumstances has little chance of being 
adopted in our political system. A voting mechanism that would reach 
the correct outcome, but might reach different outcomes in different 
contexts where economic development takings would garner stronger 
local support, has greater promise. 
95 The project upheld in Kelo was primarily funded by a grant from the state of Connecti- 
cut. Local residents effectively had no skin in the game. See id at 475. 
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V. A Plea for Constitutional Flexibility 
Direct voting by property owners, although subject to certain li- 
miting conditions, would seem to be a worthy addition to the local 
government toolkit, at least on an experimental basis. It would be re- 
grettable if courts were to stifle innovations along these lines in the 
name of constitutional purity. At present, however, there appears to be 
enough flexibility in existing constitutional doctrine to permit experi- 
mentation with direct voting by property owners to continue. 
One potential source of constitutional trouble is found in older 
decisional aw invalidating statutes allowing property owners to veto 
certain uses of property by neighbors, on the ground that these laws 
impermissibly delegate governmental power to private parties "un- 
controlled by any standard or rule."96 These troublesome precedents 
are difficult todistinguish from others, which uphold statutes allowing 
property owners to consent to uses of property by neighbors that are 
otherwise prohibited.97 
It is doubtful that the old nondelegation cases have any continu- 
ing force in the realm of direct voting. Recent decisions have held that 
direct voting mechanisms cannot be characterized as a legislative del- 
egation of power. In Forest City Enterprises, the Court held that the 
"discernible standard" rule is "inapplicable where, as here, rather than 
dealing with a delegation of power, we deal with a power reserved by 
the people to themselves," and determined that a charter amendment 
permitting voters to decide whether a zoned use of property could be 
altered is not invalid on federal constitutional grounds.98 
Another potentially troublesome constitutional doctrine is the 
Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote principle. The Court has ex- 
tended this principle to any elected body that "perform[s] important 
governmental functions" that significantly affect all citizens residing 
within the electoral district." In particular, the Court has invalidated 
96 Seattle Title Trust Co v Roberge, 278 US 116, 122 (1928) (holding unconstitutional a city 
ordinance requiring a person to obtain the written consent of two-thirds of the area property 
owners before building a philanthropic home for children or elderly people). See also Eubank v 
City of Richmond, 226 US 137, 140-45 (1912) (same). 
97 See, for example, Thomas Cusack Co v City of Chicago, 242 US 526, 531 (1917). 
98 426 US at 675 (determining that a referendum on zoning changes does not violate due 
process). See also City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 538 US 
188, 199 (2003) (reaffirming this principle). 
99 See, for example, Hadley v Junior College District, 397 US 50, 53-54 (1970) (applying the 
one-person, one-vote principle to the election of junior college trustees). 
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voting schemes that limit the electoral franchise to property owners 
and property tax payers. 
°° 
The Court has nevertheless exempted from this rule voting ar- 
rangements for special-purpose bodies whose activities are "far re- 
moved from normal governmental activities" and whose actions affect 
certain definable groups of constituents disproportionately more than 
others.101 In Salyer Land Company v Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
District™ the Court upheld a voting scheme for the directors of a pub- 
lic water district, under which landowners enjoyed exclusive voting 
powers in proportion to their acreage.03 Although the water district 
exercised some governmental powers, including employment and con- 
tracting powers, and the power of eminent domain, the district could 
only use these powers to control "the acquisition, storage, and distri- 
bution of water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin."104 In Ball v 
James,105 the Court considered whether an analogous voting scheme 
for a large water reclamation district offering diverse services, ranging 
from selling electricity to virtually half of Arizona's state population, 
to flood control, to environmental management, likewise escaped the 
strictures of "one-person, one-vote."106 The Court held that the differ- 
ences between the Arizona and California districts amounted merely 
100 Kramer v Union Free School District, 395 US 621, 627 (1969) (striking down a voter 
qualification statute for school district elections limiting the vote to owners or lessees of taxable 
real property (or their spouses) and parents or guardians of public school children). See also City 
of Phoenix v Kolodziejski, 399 US 204, 212-13 (1970) (invalidating municipal voting schemes 
granting only property tax payers the right to vote in elections called to approve the issuance of 
municipal utility bonds); Cipriano v City ofHouma, 395 US 701, 706 (1969) (same). 
101 Hadley, 397 US at 56 (considering the possibility that there may arise instances "in 
which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal govern- 
mental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election in 
compliance with [Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964)] . . . might not be required"). See also 
Avery v Midland County, 390 US 474, 483-84 (1968) ("Were the Commissioners Court a special- 
purpose unit of government . . . [performing] . . . functions affecting definable groups of constitu- 
ents more than other constituents, we would have to confront he question whether such a body 
may be apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the 
organization's functions."). 
102 410 US 719 (1973). On the same day it decided Salyer, the Court affirmed a similar 
scheme in Wyoming. See Associated Enterprises, Ine v Toltec Watershed Improvement District, 410 
US 743, 745 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding the requirement that voters in a referendum on 
whether to create a water district be landowners, and that the creation be contingent on receipt 
of a majority of the acreage of the lands within the proposed district). 
103 410 US at 728. Eighty-five percent of the Iblare Lake Basin Water Storage District's 
193,000 acres were farmed by four corporations; however, the district was exclusively devoted to 
agriculture and populated by only seventy-seven individuals. Id at 723. 
104 Id at 728. 
K* 451 US 355 (1981). 
106 Id at 370-71. 
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to differences of scale and upheld the constitutionality of property- 
based voting schemes for large, general purpose water districts. 
While the Supreme Court has yet to affirm property-based voting 
in special purpose districts outside the water conservation context, 
nothing in Ball or Sayler suggests that the exception to the one- 
person, one-vote principle is limited to water conservation districts. 
The Second Circuit, in Kessler v Grand Central District Management 
Association™ extended the one-person, one-vote exception to a Busi- 
ness Improvement District (BID), noting the "greater complexity and 
novelty of the problems facing urban areas" and "the need for go- 
vernmental creativity" in addressing urban land use problems.08 The 
court concluded that a BID exists for a special, limited purpose, that 
its activities disproportionately affect property owners, that it does not 
exercise general governmental powers, and that it thus should not be 
bound by the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote requirement.109 
The examples of direct voting by property owners considered in 
this Article would appear to fall within the parameters of the excep- 
tion created by the Supreme Court to the one-person, one-vote prin- 
ciple in Ball and Sayler and extended by the courts of appeals in cases 
like Kessler. Provided voting by property owners is used to resolve 
discrete, local controversies that disproportionately affect property 
owners, and is not used to control the discharge of general govern- 
ment powers, this tool should not be condemned in the name of one- 
person, one-vote absolutism. 
In addition, if direct local voting is structured along the lines of 
the Connecticut Historic Districts Act, an affirmative ote of local 
property owners is not the final step in the process of exercising coer- 
cive governmental uthority. Such a vote is a necessary condition of 
governmental ction, but the decisive final step is taken by the city 
council, which is presumably elected in a manner consistent with one- 
person, one-vote precepts. As a practical matter, the city council is 
unlikely to defy the will of the local property voters. But the fact that 
the ultimate legal action is that of the city council, not the voters, 
should further insulate direct local voting from constitutional chal- 
lenge under either nondelegation or one-person, one-vote doctrines. 
107 158 F3d 92 (2d Cir 1998). 
108 Id at 103 (reasoning that this governmental flexibility must be met with greater judicial 
flexibility such that the "mere designation of an elective body to perform a large number of 
functions does not trigger" the one-person, one-vote requirement). 
109 Id at 133-34. 
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Conclusion 
Direct voting by property owners holds considerable promise as a 
decisional tool for local government. If structured properly, it can pro- 
duce well-informed, highly legitimate, corruption-free decisions. If not 
structured properly, it could produce irrational outcomes, virulent 
NIMBYism, and majoritarian and minoritarian bias. I hope I have 
shown, through the discussion of historic preservation districts and 
economic development akings, that well-structured local voting by 
property owners is possible. Further experimentation with this me- 
chanism would appear to be warranted, in an effort o determine 
whether these suggestive applications can be extended. 
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